6.2 BUDGET ANALYSIS

6.2.1 National Science Foundation

From the many compelling potential investments in critical ground-based infrastructure, the committee identifies three (one for each program) and suggests the appropriate funding vehicles for each, as follows (see Recommendations 5-2 and 5-3 in Section 5.2):

• Mid-scale Research Infrastructure (MSRI)-1: The observing system simulation experiment (OSSE) study of the Distributed Array of Scientific Heterogeneous Instruments (DASHI);
• MSRI-2: Implementation of the Frequency-Agile Solar Radiotelescope (FASR); and
• Major Research Equipment and Facilities Construction (MREFC): Development of the Next Generation Global Oscillations Network Group (ngGONG).

The committee notes that additional budgetary growth may be needed to accommodate a revitalization of the CubeSat program (see Recommendation 5-5 in Section 5.2). In addition, an agencywide strategy and adequate funding are needed to support NSF’s increasing space weather responsibilities under the 2020 Promoting Research and Observations of Space Weather to Improve the Forecasting of Tomorrow Act (PROSWIFT Act; P.L. 116-181) (see Recommendation 3-1 in Chapter 3). Details on the budget required to support this growth are outside this decadal survey’s scope.

6.2.2 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

Similarly, the NOAA budget must grow to accommodate the increased integration of NOAA space weather assets into space weather research (see Recommendation 3-4 in Chapter 3) and to accommodate the extensive and ambitious program of space-based and ground-based space weather assets in the next decade. However, the committee did not perform an analysis of the required budget growth, because it was outside this decadal survey’s scope. Costs for the creation of a space weather research program (see Table 6-1) were assumed to be the same as those for the NASA flagship-level community science modeling program.

6.2.3 U.S. Air Force

Increased support will be needed to accommodate the space weather roles prescribed for the Department of Defense (DoD)/U.S. Air Force in the PROSWIFT Act. However, the committee did not perform an analysis of the required budget growth as it was outside this decadal survey’s scope.

of $856 million is assumed for FY 2025. This FY 2025 budget is consistent with the budget profile for FY 2024 and FY 2025 in the FY 2024 budget request. Growth occurs in two stages from this FY 2025 baseline: a onetime increase followed by reasonably steady growth over the remainder of the decade. The recommended budget profile in Figure 6-1 reflects this two-stage growth. The sum of this profile over the 10 years of the next decade is equal to the total budget needed for the Heliophysics Division. The budget in any given year is not necessarily consistent with this recommended profile because the precise phasing of programs is the responsibility of the Heliophysics Division.

This two-stage budget growth represents the investment that is crucially needed in solar and space physics science and space weather research. With this budget profile, NASA will have the means to implement its part of the comprehensive research strategy (see recommendations in Sections 5.2 and 5.3). Below, the augmented elements of the research strategy are discussed along with their budget implications, as summarized in Table 6-2. The full budget profile is shown in Figure 6-1.

Conclusion: To complete the program of record, to resume GDC in 2026, and to put GDC and DYNAMIC on schedule to launch in 2031, NASA’s Heliophysics Division budget needs to increase by approximately 17 percent from FY 2025 to FY 2026 to $1 billion. To fully implement the decadal survey’s comprehensive research strategy after this initial FY 2026 budget increase, the Heliophysics Division budget needs to grow by approximately 8.25 percent each year to the end of the decade.

Technology

Technology program investments are vital for the future of the Heliophysics Division, both in the next decade and beyond. This budget is taken directly from the FY 2024 President’s Budget Request and is augmented by $5 million per year in FY 2024 dollars. This additional investment is notional and directed toward the Heliophysics Strategic Technology Office (HESTO) office; it provides a solid foundation to build a thriving technology program.

Research

Research is fundamental to advancing NASA heliophysics science. The research budget, as defined in the FY 2024 President’s Budget Request includes mission and research support, data management, operations of some of the Heliophysics System Observatory (HSO) infrastructure space missions (e.g., Voyager and Wind), the suborbital and CubeSat programs, and the Heliophysics Guest Investigator (HGI), Heliophysics Supporting Research (HSR), and most other grants solicited under the Research Opportunities in Space and Earth Science (ROSES) solicitation. Additional research funding is included in the LWS Science and Heliophysics Technology programs.

In FY 2025, research accounts for about 30 percent of the budget. The research strategy assumes funding for these research elements per the FY 2024 President’s Budget Request with level funding for some elements. For example, level funding through the next decade is assumed for most HSO science and infrastructure missions, with the exception of missions nearing the end of their lifetime. For example, Voyager operations are funded through 2030, per the latest NASA estimate for the end of the mission. Funding augmentations for several elements are described below and summarized in Table 6-3 at the end of this chapter.

The Heliophysics CubeSat program is at $9 million for FY 2025, which is less than half of the maximum funding level during the previous decade. In Section 5.2, there is a recommendation for a review of the NSF and NASA CubeSat programs to ensure that their success over the past decade continues (Recommendation 5-5). In the Heliophysics budget for the next decade (Figure 6-1), funding for the CubeSat program is assumed in FY 2025 to return to $20 million/year and to grow with inflation thereafter. The actual funding level for this important science and training program would be determined in the recommended review.

Recommendation 5-16 in Section 5.3 requests that the Heliophysics Division maintain a success rate of at least 25 percent for ROSES research proposals without decreasing the average size of the research grants. Accomplishing such success rates requires a budget increase for the HGI and other R&A program elements. While the exact increases need to be determined yearly, a representative increase of 20 percent for most

TABLE 6-2 NASA Heliophysics Division Assets

NOTE: All of these assets have implications for the NASA budget and are discussed in this section.

Heliophysics Division research programs is assumed in FY 2026, and the new budget is assumed to grow with inflation thereafter.

Recommendation 5-4 introduces the flagship-level community science modeling program. This significant community endeavor is envisioned to be at a level similar to that of an Explorer MO. Per the recommendation, the actual cost and phasing is still to be determined. Indicative of the envisioned effort, the NASA research budget is augmented by $125 million in RY$ and this funding is spread over a 5-year development phase starting in FY 2027 followed by a 2-year operations phase at lower funding.

NASA Space Weather Program

The Space Weather Program grows each year from its baseline FY 2025 budget of $36 million such that its annual budget doubles by the end of the decade, as depicted in Figure 6-1. This baseline budget includes Space Weather Centers of Excellence, which are similar in scope to the DRIVE Science Centers, as well as other research and analysis associated with research to operations. The baseline budget also includes two hosted payloads: the Heliophysics Environmental and Radiation Measurement Experiment Suite (HERMES) instrument suite on the Gateway space station and the solar imaging instrument on the European Space Agency Vigil mission. These payloads represent the beginning of a space weather demonstration line implemented as hosted payloads, funded from and managed by the Space Weather Program. Furthermore, additional hosted demonstration payloads not yet planned are assumed to be funded from this baseline budget. The number and total cost of these hosted payloads are not known; however, the assumed cost of an individual payload is in Table 6-1.

In addition to the Space Weather Program baseline budget, there is an additional budget increase of approximately $190 million in RY$ over the next decade. This increase funds a new line of stand-alone space weather technology demonstration missions (Recommendation 3-5). The allocated funding is sufficient for a mission up to the size of a SMEX but is not sufficient for a standalone launch (according to the current Explorer budget guidelines). Therefore, other options such as a rideshares need to be pursued. Beyond the next decade and funding permitting, this program might grow to include a MIDEX-class space weather demonstration mission line.

NASA Heliophysics Explorers

The Explorer program has been extremely successful over the past decade with several missions launched and operating. However, this success has come at a price. In the FY 2024 President’s Budget Request, the Explorer

program constitutes 44 percent of the Heliophysics budget by FY 2026. The Explorer program comprises several elements, including management; Explorers and MOs in development, in prime operations, and in extended operations; and future Explorers and MOs. The funding for management and extended operations is assumed to be that of the FY 2024 President’s Budget Request. Management and extended operations of existing Explorers is approximately 15 percent of the total Explorer program budget for FY 2025, and these elements increase to 21 percent of the total budget in FY 2026 under the assumption that all missions continue extended operations. Beyond FY 2027, these two elements are assumed to have a nearly flat budget (in FY 2024 dollars), with modest increases to account for the addition of those Explorers and MOs that reach extended mission operations.

The Explorer budget from the FY 2024 President’s Budget Request includes completion of the Explorers and MOs currently in development. These include two MIDEX missions selected in February 2022 that are in early development. The HelioSwarm mission budget follows the FY 2024 President’s Budget Request profile and an estimated life-cycle cost of $550 million through prime mission (FY 2030). Similarly, the Multi-slit Solar Explorer (MUSE) budget follows the FY 2024 President’s Budget Request profile with an estimated life-cycle cost of $350 million through prime mission (FY 2029). Both mission life-cycle costs include access to space. However, because these missions have not yet been confirmed, a baseline cost commitment has not been determined. Any growth in these costs will negatively impact the budget and result in further delays for new heliophysics science.

Recommendation 5-7 (Section 5.2) discusses the cadence of the Explorer program and introduces a new HeLEX-class explorer. The budget implications for these recommendations are discussed below.

A single mission downselect is assumed from the SMEX FY 2022 announcement of opportunity (AO), with Phase A currently in progress and Phase B is assumed to start in FY 2025.¹ The budget profiles used for all Explorers are based on an estimate provided by NASA. These budgets were in FY 2022 dollars and have been inflated to RY$ per the NASA inflation index. The total life-cycle cost assumes project development at the cost cap and includes the cost of program management and access to space. As an example, the SMEX selected in 2022 has a life-cycle cost of $329 million in FY 2022 dollars.

The Explorer budget includes a MIDEX AO and a MO AO released in FY 2025 with downselect and project start in FY 2027. While it is recommended that the MIDEX and MO AOs be separated, the budget profile assumes that the two AOs are released in the same year. Note that offsetting the two AOs has a very minor impact on the overall budget. The principal investigator (PI) cost cap for the FY 2025 MIDEX solicitation (not including access to space) is assumed to be $300 million in FY 2024 dollars to account for increased program costs. The budget uses the funding profile provided by NASA’s Heliophysics Division, subsequently inflated to RY$ to match the solicitation profile. The MIDEX Phase B development starts in FY 2028. The cost cap for FY 2025 MO is $70 million using the profile provided by NASA.

Following Recommendation 5-7, the budget includes a HeLEX mission AO in 2031 at a PI cost cap of $600 million in FY 2022 dollars with downselect/project start in 2033. Funding and phasing are scaled from doubling the MIDEX FY 2022 PI cost cap (including access to space). When inflated to RY$, this project results in ~$150 million burden in the next decade and ~$1.1 billion from FY 2033 through FY 2040. For the next decade, the budget increase in Table 6-1 is calculated by determining the difference in costs for selecting a HeLEX instead of a MIDEX in 2031. This follows from assuming that MIDEX and HeLEX will be solicited in an alternating fashion, always with a SMEX in between.

Increasing the cadence of the Explorer program was a high priority for the 2013 decadal survey. The increase was largely successful; the next decade will see an Explorer or MO launch every year. However, the result of the rapidly increased cadence is that large sums are held in reserve for launch vehicle costs, and the share of the total budget spent on Explorers and MOs has increased dramatically. Adding the selection of two MIDEX missions in FY 2022, the Explorer program will comprise 44 percent of the total budget in FY 2026

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¹ For NASA missions, the life cycle of a project is defined as a series of phases. Pre-Phase A: Concept Studies; Phase A: Concept and Technology Development; Phase B: Preliminary Design and Technology Completion; Phase C: Final Design and Fabrication; Phase D: System Assembly, Integration and Test, Launch; Phase E: Operations and Sustainment; and Phase F: Extended Mission Operations and Closeout. NASA References, “SEH 3.0 NASA Program/Project Life Cycle,” NASA Headquarters, https://www.nasa.gov/reference/3-0-nasa-program-project-life-cycle, updated July 23, 2023.

and approximately the same percentage in FY 2027. This growth puts significant pressure on the rest of the Heliophysics Division budget.

A vibrant and strong Explorer program can extend into the next decade and relieve pressure on the Heliophysics Division budget by maintaining a 2- to 3-year cadence. In the budget profile in Figure 6-1, the decrease in the Explorer and MO budget starting in FY 2030 is the result of resolving the backlog and assuming only single selections for new Explorers starting with the FY 2022 SMEX. Additional savings could potentially come from engaging the Venture Class Acquisition of Dedicated and Rideshare (VADR) launch services to help reduce access to space costs.

Solar Terrestrial Probes Mission Line Management, Dynamical Neutral Atmosphere–Ionosphere Coupling, and the New Solar Terrestrial Probes Mission

The STP and LWS mission lines are both essential to the scientific discoveries discussed in Chapter 2. The STP management funding includes the STP missions in development, funding to complete development, launch, prime and extended mission operations for the Interstellar Mapping and Acceleration Probe (IMAP), and extended mission funding for other STP missions in the HSO. All elements of the STP missions are funded at a level that matches the FY 2024 President’s Budget Request. The IMAP budget assumes launch in FY 2025, prime mission through FY 2027, and extended mission beyond FY 2027. Funding for the Magnetospheric Multiscale Mission (MMS), Solar Terrestrial Relations Observatory (STEREO), Hinode, and Thermosphere, Ionosphere, Mesosphere Energetics and Dynamics (TIMED) extended missions is also included, assuming they all continue operations with funding at the levels of the FY 2026 budget in later years.

The budget profile for DYNAMIC development is shown separately as it is not included in the FY 2024 President’s Budget Request. DYNAMIC development cost and phasing (including management and excluding access to space) was provided by NASA. The total life-cycle cost is $335 million, and the phasing of the development is designed to ensure that this important mission launches within ±3 months of GDC in FY 2031 to allow for coordinated operations.

The highest-priority new STP mission for the next decade is a constellation mission similar to the notional Links Between Regions and Scales in Geospace, or “Links” mission. A summary of the technical and cost information obtained from the technical, risk, and cost evaluation (TRACE) process is in Appendix G. The Links concept is a flagship-class system science mission concept that illuminates the dynamic connections of the near-Earth space environment. It is an ambitious heterogenous constellation-class mission with 24 in situ spacecraft and two imaging spacecraft. Consistent with the TRACE analysis, a 7-year development is assumed with a new start in FY 2027 (before the launch of DYNAMIC) and launch no earlier than FY 2035. The total estimated life-cycle cost of this mission is $1.86 billion of which $117 million of development and operations costs would impact beyond the next decade. This total cost includes a space weather enhancement as suggested in the Panel on Space Weather and Science Applications report in Appendix E and assessed by the TRACE analysis (see Appendix G).

Living With a Star Mission Line Management, Geospace Dynamics Constellation, and the New Living With a Star Mission

The LWS mission line is the strategic mission line that focuses on basic science discoveries that may have implications for space weather. The management funding includes all items shown in the FY 2024 President’s Budget Request maintained at their projected levels. These items include Solar Orbiter collaboration, LWS science, program management, and extended operations for Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO) and Parker Solar Probe (PSP).

Because GDC is not included in the FY 2024 President’s Budget Request, its budget profile is shown separately in Figure 6-1. This budget profile was provided by NASA and follows the recommendations of the Independent Review Board (IRB) report (NASA 2022) with full development restart in FY 2025 and launch in FY 2031 together with DYNAMIC. The total estimated life-cycle cost is $1.2 billion through the prime mission.

The highest-priority new LWS mission for the next decade is the notional Solar Polar Orbiter (SPO), a mission focusing on the Sun’s polar regions. A summary of the technical and cost information obtained from the TRACE

process is in Appendix G. SPO is a bold mission to image the Sun from a completely new vantage point to answer fundamental questions about the generation of the solar magnetic fields, and determine how those fields drive solar activity and shape the heliosphere. The mission uses planetary gravity assists to achieve a 3-year orbit that is >70 degrees out of the ecliptic, allowing extended periods of observation of both the northern and southern polar regions of the Sun. The mission lifetime spans at least one solar activity cycle. A new start for this mission is planned for FY 2029 as GDC development is ramping down. Phase B starts in 2031, after the GDC launch, and a 6-year development was included for this deep space mission development that includes Jupiter and Venus gravity assists. The mission has a total life-cycle cost of ~$2.08 billion, of which approximately half is realized before FY 2034, assuming launch in FY 2037. The prime mission operations extend over a solar cycle to FY 2049.

Budget Growth and Decision Rules

The program budget assumes an increase in FY 2026 and then annual budget growth of approximately 8.5 percent for the remainder of the next decade. This budget growth is needed to implement the research strategy and to make significant progress on the priority science in Chapter 2 and in NASA’s contribution to space weather (see Chapter 3).

If the Heliophysics Division budget remains flat at FY 2024 levels, then almost all science focus areas in Chapter 2 will be seriously compromised. In this flat budget scenario, none of the augmentations will be implemented, nor will any flagship mission be completed in the next decade. That is, GDC and DYNAMIC, high priorities from the 2013 decadal survey, would not be completed, and there would be no new STP or LWS missions in the next decade. They delay of these missions would seriously compromise the HSL. A flat budget would result in an unprecedented situation where funding would be insufficient to complete even the highest-priority STP and LWS missions from the 2013 decadal survey. The failure to complete GDC and DYNAMIC would seriously upset the balance of the recommended strategy because these two missions are the only ones that provide substantial progress on the ionosphere–thermosphere–mesosphere components of science focus areas in Chapter 2. Furthermore, STP and LWS missions, with their expanded resources, advance science in several focus areas, whereas the smaller Explorer missions cannot realistically meet the challenges of the broad guiding questions in Chapter 2. A flat budget would be devastating to the entire solar and space physics community. The field would shrink as researchers and engineers would have no incentive to enter or remain, knowing that there are neither exciting scientific opportunities nor funding to support their efforts.

A flat Heliophysics Division budget could be highly damaging to society. The proliferation of low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites to meet the increasing demand for communication and location services increases the likelihood of collisions with potentially catastrophic consequences and greatly exacerbates space traffic management challenges (Boley and Byers 2021). The spacecraft operators need improved characterization of orbital environments, including drag and orbital debris impacts. Adequate monitoring and prediction of the radiation environment are also essential to enable humans and their technological systems to venture again beyond the protection of LEO. Indeed, an unprotected astronaut working on the lunar surface will depend on adequate warning systems for their survival.²

Power grids are already challenged by the variable loads introduced as renewable energy sources are integrated with conventional fossil fuel energy sources. Space weather–induced disturbances could be devastating to networks that already operate close to their limit capacity. A detailed understanding and ability to forecast the impact of magnetic storms is needed now, to inform the development of the 21st century power grid, which needs to handle these highly variable loads.

These concerns have been acknowledged in recent legislation, such as the PROSWIFT Act, which aims to improve monitoring and prediction of the space environment. These improvements will only be possible with a better understanding of the underlying processes. In short, the space weather goals in Chapter 3 cannot be accom-

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² See Smith and Scalo (2007) and references therein, which notes that “The August 1972 [solar particle event] SPE, often taken as the standard high-fluence event for protection studies, was not an isolated anomaly. The February 1956, November 1960, October 1989, and October–November 2003 events produced solar particle fluxes sufficiently large that an astronaut on the moon protected by only a spacesuit would likely have perished, and many events approaching these fluences have been recorded.”

plished with a flat budget. In particular, the failure to launch GDC and DYNAMIC seriously compromises the outcome for atmospheric driving in the first space weather theme (System of Systems: Drivers of Space Weather; see Section 3.2.1) and will result in a dearth of observations in LEO that are essential for ionospheric space weather modeling (see Section 3.3.5). A decade-long pause in advancement of solar and space physics, combined with a loss of talent, has potentially catastrophic implications, because other pursuits rely on this knowledge and workforce.

Building on the accomplishments already made by the program of record, the research strategy maximizes the exciting and rewarding science for the next decade while maintaining and enhancing space weather research programs, including pathways from research to operations. To be successful, the strategy will leverage all elements of the program of record, including GDC and DYNAMIC, and will require sustained budget growth over the decade. If this sustained budget growth is insufficient to accomplish the entire research strategy, then decision rules must be implemented.

For the Explorer program, if there is a delay in this important program, its 2- to 3-year cadence would resume once funding is available. With their associated delays, the invocation of even some of these decision rules will significantly impact the solar and space physics community and society. In the decadal survey committee’s view, a failure to capitalize on the opportunities presented in this report would result in a true “lost decade” for solar and space physics.

The decision rules are designed to preserve the completion of the program of record at the expense of everything that would be new for the next decade, even the augmentation of the Heliophysics Research Program. The rules are also designed to have the largest impact later in the decade, under the assumption that the budget challenges will compound as the decade progresses. Last, the decision rules respond to budget shortfalls and are listed in the order they should be implemented. As additional funding becomes available, they should be implemented in reverse order.

Significant cost increases for the LWS and STP missions, including those in development, would have a disproportionate effect on the overall budget profile and program balance. While any strategic mission called out in this report is an integral part of the committee’s balanced strategy, none should be allowed to jeopardize the entire portfolio. Therefore, if any LWS or STP mission life-cycle costs increase more than approximately 30 percent over the estimated cost at Key Decision Point-B (KDP-B),³ the committee suggests that NASA conduct a standard continuation review of the program and implement the changes that come out of that review. However, it is important for such reviews to consider the implications for program balance across the entire program. For example, if the GDC mission costs increase by 30 percent over its estimated life-cycle costs at KDP-B, a review of the program’s future would include consideration of the mission’s relation to other elements of the Heliophysics Division flight program.

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³ KDP-B is the key decision point where a NASA project transitions from concept and technology development to preliminary design and technology completion. KDP-C is the key decision point where a NASA project transitions from Preliminary Design and technology completion to final design and fabrication. This KDP is also called confirmation.

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