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Climate and Security Challenges in Central America

To advance the workshop’s goal of developing an integrative systems understanding of climate security risk, workshop participants explored the social, economic, political, and environmental dynamics at play in Central America through a discussion with a panel of three invited experts. Mr. David Holiday, an independent consultant and member of the workshop planning committee, described the underlying human and natural geography of the region. Dr. Edwin Castellanos, of The Nature Conservancy, described the key climate risks facing the region. A representative from the National Intelligence Council (NIC)¹ described the security dynamics in Central America that are relevant to U.S. national interests. Mr. Eric Olson, of the Seattle International Foundation and a member of the workshop planning committee, moderated the panel discussion and also offered his own remarks on the region’s climate and security landscape.

Olson set the stage for the panel discussion by noting the enormous economic, social, security, and environmental challenges permeating Central American societies (see Box 2-1). Poverty and inequality, violence and crime, corruption and weak governance are all endemic to most of the countries in the region, and the confluence of these interconnected challenges with climate and other environmental stressors has had a devastating impact on the social fabric of the region. Olson challenged the panel and participants to carefully examine the exogenous and endogenous climate and security indicators at play in Central America, in the hope that the discussion would produce a deeper understanding of the challenges that the region and the United States face.

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¹ This workshop included participants from members of the Intelligence Community (IC). To abide by legal requirements to protect the identities of IC officers, wherever a specific attribution other than workshop participant is needed, this proceedings will use member of the IC, representative of Agency X, or similar.

STRUCTURAL VULNERABILITIES OF THE CENTRAL AMERICA REGION

In his remarks, Holiday argued that the region’s climate and security risks are fundamentally linked to systemic political and economic vulnerabilities deeply ingrained into Central American societies. He noted that violence, crime, and corruption in the region, and the resultant vulnerability to climate impacts, have traditionally been viewed as discrete problems that can be solved through targeted policies and investments. He argued that these challenges instead stem from profound, multidimensional structural vulnerabilities that are unlikely to change meaningfully in the near term. In his view, any climate resilience strategies that do not confront the region’s interlocking inequality, underdevelopment, and poor governance would be doomed to fail or provide only superficial solutions.

Delving into the sociopolitical backdrop, Holiday highlighted extremely low tax collection rates that provide minimal domestic revenue for governments to invest in development or climate adaptation. For example, Guatemala’s ratio of tax to gross domestic product (GDP) is only 10%, lower than elsewhere in Latin America. Moreover, regressive value-added taxes comprise the bulk of revenue, disproportionately impacting the poor. This resource scarcity constrains governments’

ability to tackle poverty, malnutrition, and other issues that exacerbate climate vulnerability even if they desire to address them. Additionally, Central American economies frequently consume more than they produce, with high costs of living and no financial cushion at the national or household level. This gap is filled through remittances and foreign direct investment rather than domestic economic productivity. The rural Dry Corridor region, containing 10.5 million highly climate-vulnerable people, relies almost solely on subsistence agriculture. Urban areas fare little better, with large informal economies lacking health care, pensions, or social safety nets that could provide climate resilience.

Holiday argued that these ingrained political, social, and economic structures are the true root causes of climate vulnerability, not symptomatic issues such as weak governance or institutions. Moreover, he was deeply skeptical that these vulnerabilities can be meaningfully reduced in the short term under current governance regimes and policy approaches. For example, Holiday noted, authoritarian governance trends are reducing civic space for inclusive policy dialogue and debate on building climate resilience. Holiday mentioned that robust multistakeholder engagement and strong environmental agencies are sorely lacking. Corruption and lack of accountability are endemic. Such authoritarian government contexts will only perpetuate existing climate vulnerabilities, he said.

Holiday also noted that migration is viewed primarily as a climate security risk but also represents an essential coping mechanism to environmental stressors and a source of societal resilience. He explained that given the profound vulnerabilities across economic, political, and climate spheres, migration has served as a crucial “safety valve” that has created economic and familial connections abroad for Central American communities for decades. As an example, Holiday mentioned that over 95% of households in highly climate-vulnerable rural farming areas have had at least one migrant member in the past decade. Remittances now comprise an enormous share of GDP for countries like El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. He argued that these countries’ economies would likely collapse without the remittance lifeline. Therefore, migration is an adaptive livelihood strategy enabling survival of the region’s unequal and unstable sociopolitical systems.

In closing, Holiday argued that progress on Central America’s complex climate security challenges requires moving beyond current approaches fixated on discrete solutions to governance or institutional solutions. It likely means recasting migration as an essential means of societal resilience, not just a climate risk. Most crucially, it may involve transforming the deeper status quo of inequality, inadequate livelihoods, and poor governance inhibiting meaningful climate adaptation across the region.

EXAMPLES OF KEY CLIMATE RISKS

Castellanos prefaced his remarks by describing the framework for climate risk used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which comprises three dynamically interacting components: hazards, exposure, and vulnerability. Hazards refers to climate-related events, such as floods and droughts, that can cause loss of life or health, as well as damage and loss to livelihoods, infrastructure, and resources. Exposure reflects the presence of people, infrastructure, resources and economic, social, or other cultural assets in areas that could be subject to the climate hazards. Vulnerability encompasses the social, economic, governance, and other factors that shape a society’s overall susceptibility to climate impacts and its capacity to cope with them. Castellanos described the Central America region as highly exposed, inherently vulnerable, and already strongly impacted by climate change. He shared that, in the IPCC’s most recent assessment (IPCC, 2023), Central America’s precarious situation stems from the confluence of extreme inequality, widespread poverty, rapid population growth, land use change and deforestation, biodiversity and soil loss, and dependence of local economies on natural resources—all layered upon the region’s baseline climate variability and weather extremes. He framed climate change as a threat multiplier that further exacerbates these preexisting conditions.

Castellanos reiterated that Central America already experiences significant hazards from a highly variable climate, such as extreme weather events, which are increasing in frequency and severity because of climate change. With respect to exposure, Castellanos explained that much of Central America’s population resides in areas with fragile, landslide-prone, volcanic soils. This landslide risk is heightened by deforestation on steep slopes. Intense rainfall events, even without major storms, can trigger deadly landslides that bury vulnerable communities. For example, he cited a 2015 Guatemala landslide that killed 280 people, as well as recent casualties from the start of the rainy season. Persistently high poverty rates also expose large populations to climate impacts. With respect to vulnerability, Castellanos echoed the points made by Olson and Holiday, that the region’s vulnerability is fundamentally shaped by structural issues such as high poverty rates, governance deficits, lack of access to resources and services, violent conflict, and dependence on climate-sensitive livelihoods, such as smallholder agriculture.

Castellanos highlighted four key climate-related risks that threaten Central America (see Box 2-2). First, food insecurity is projected to increase in response to more variable precipitation, with more frequent and extreme droughts, disrupting subsistence farming and worsening hunger, especially in the drought-prone Dry Corridor. Second, threats to lives and infrastructure are expected to grow as a result of increased flooding and landslides, with major rain events causing catastrophic losses that could entirely offset GDP growth. Third, water insecurity is projected to increase, despite abundant rainfall, as pollution and inadequate water management intersect with increased droughts. Fourth, outbreaks of climate-sensitive infectious diseases are expected to increase, as warmer temperatures increase habitats for disease vectors, such as dengue-carrying mosquitos, which are reaching higher elevations.

Fundamentally, Castellanos painted a picture of a region already burdened by systemic vulnerabilities, in which climate change is increasing society’s exposure to increased rainfall variability, more frequent extreme events, worsening and lengthening droughts, elevated temperatures enabling disease spread to new areas, and other impacts. He noted that the confluence of all of these risk factors exposes the region to profound human costs and the reversal of many social and economic gains of the past. In his view, sustainably addressing Central America’s climate insecurity requires confronting the deeply rooted vulnerabilities that allow climate impacts to wreak such damage; he again echoed the comments of Holiday on the urgent need for holistic resilience solutions.

EXAMPLES OF KEY SECURITY RISKS

The representative from the NIC provided a detailed explanation of the framework through which the Intelligence Community (IC) examines Central America, noting that the region’s evolving security dynamics have significant implications for three pillars of U.S. national security strategy—protecting the homeland, promoting U.S. prosperity, and defending democratic values (see Box 2-3). Beyond these strategic considerations, Central America holds significance for U.S. foreign policy because of the strong people-to-people bonds through migration, robust trade relationships, and enduring security partnerships. These multidimensional linkages make Central America disproportionately relevant to U.S. interests compared with its relatively small geographic and economic footprint.

Examining people-to-people ties, the IC officer noted that nearly 4 million Central American immigrants reside in the United States presently, with around 85% coming from the Northern Triangle nations of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (O’Connor et al., 2019). This includes a mix of legal migrants through family reunification, employment visas, and asylum claims, as well as irregular migrants. The scale of remittances totals tens of billions annually, equating to over $200 billion in the past decade, according to estimates (O’Connor et al., 2019). This massive flow demonstrates the close transnational connectivity between U.S. and Central American societies through migration and remittances. Moreover, travel and tourism are a two-way street, with millions visiting family and attractions in both directions each year.

On migration, the IC officer acknowledged that a great deal of U.S. domestic policy and political energy is focused on combatting irregular migration into the United States along its southern border, but relatively much less attention is paid to the role of climate change and natural disasters in worsening the economic fragility, food insecurity, and desperation that drive people to seek opportunities abroad through illegal channels. The IC officer noted that Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador are especially vulnerable to climate impacts that can exacerbate outward migration pressures. Moreover, Central America has become a transit zone for extra-regional migrants from the Caribbean, South America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, who traverse Central America en route to the United States. Many of these migrants are also compelled to move, at least in part, by environmental stressors, and their movement reflects the global connectivity of climate impacts.

With respect to economic ties, the IC officer noted that the combined Central American economy totals approximately $300 billion, with very diverse individual national income levels (World Bank, 2023). The middle-income countries of Costa Rica and Panama have per capita GDPs of $15,000–20,000, while the lower-income countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua have per capita GDPs of only $2,000-5,000 (FocusEconomics, 2023). The IC officer noted that U.S. exports to Central America supported more than 130,000 American jobs, according to Department of Commerce estimates (Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, n.d.). Total bilateral trade reached around $60 billion, making Central America the 18^th-largest U.S. trading partner (Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, n.d.). The IC officer also mentioned the landmark Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement, which consolidated these economic ties in 2004, as the first such U.S. deal with developing countries (Rodriquez and Matschke, 2023).

With respect to crime, the IC officer stated that Central America serves as a logistical corridor for Colombian cocaine trafficking networks to supply Mexican cartels, fueling substance

abuse and violence in the United States. Gangs concentrated in the Northern Triangle drive high homicide rates, extortion, and endemic violence that further compel outward migration. The IC officer cited a 2017 study by the International Monetary Fund that estimated the cost of criminal activity to Central American economies as up to 20% of GDP annually (Lariau et al., 2019). The losses to livelihoods, infrastructure, and resources from climate impacts intensifies existing economic and social vulnerability and can exacerbate recruitment into criminal groups and entrainment of communities into the illicit economy.

With respect to geopolitics, the IC officer noted that Central America’s proximity to the United States has made it disproportionately important to U.S. strategic interests and has also enabled significant projection of U.S. influence into the region. Since the Cold War, the official U.S. policy in Central America has primarily been directed to promoting democratic governance and economic prosperity, as well as countering the influence of extra-regional actors such as China and Russia. One vital strategic priority in the region is the Panama Canal, which for more than a century has been a critical conduit of both global trade flows and U.S. military mobility. The IC officer explained that China’s recent infrastructure investments around the Canal zone are worrisome developments for U.S. policymakers. Against this backdrop, projected climate-driven variability in rainfall and decreases in water levels will threaten the Canal’s long-term viability and only intensify concerns about sea lanes that are vital to American security and commerce. Other topics of geostrategic concern are China’s efforts to exert political influence elsewhere in the region, as evidenced by Honduras’s recent severing of diplomatic ties with Taiwan and recognition of a single Chinese nation, as well as Russia’s security-related agreements with Nicaragua, as evidenced by President Ortega’s recent expressions of support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Despite this, the IC officer expressed confidence they will not displace enduring U.S. ties with these nations, and that, despite rising competitors, the United States remains a dominant influence in the region.

The IC officer concluded their remarks by stating that Central America is critically important for U.S. strategic interests because of its geographic proximity, human and economic connectivity, and shared security challenges. Echoing the other panelists, the IC officer observed that climate change acts as a threat multiplier that could overwhelm fragile states and economies by exacerbating root-cause drivers of instability—violence, inequality, and lack of opportunity. In the IC officer’s assessment, the region would welcome continued U.S. involvement and investment as a means of enhancing its climate security, which would also help safeguard U.S. national interests. Central American climate resilience could be strengthened by addressing the systemic gaps in adaptive capacity.

PANEL DISCUSSION

Climate science evidence base – A workshop participant asked Castellanos to comment on the level of scientific confidence and the likelihood that the Central American region will experience overall reductions in precipitation under climate change. In response, Castellanos clarified that there is substantially higher uncertainty in Central America precipitation projections compared with temperature outlooks. Castellanos affirmed that the scientific community is very confident temperatures will rise significantly. However, precipitation scenarios are more variable based on differing model physics. That said, Castellanos stated that on balance, the overall trend is toward drying, especially when assessing longer time horizons. He elaborated that in the near-term, interannual to decadal precipitation variability will be the dominant factor. However, by 2050 and beyond, the drying signal strengthens and becomes more consistent across climate simulations. Castellanos attributed the short-term uncertainty to inherent natural climate variability temporarily masking or exacerbating the underlying human-caused regional drying trend. But he noted that the multidecadal drying trajectory emerges more clearly as the anthropogenic climate change influence grows over the 21st century.

Food insecurity – A workshop participant asked Castellanos how climate change might exacerbate food insecurity in the Central American Dry Corridor region by reducing yields of staple and cash crops. In response, Castellanos acknowledged the Dry Corridor’s challenges but explained that, while the area has received substantial media and policy attention, it is not a dry environment in itself and still receives ample rainfall overall. The core issue, in his view, is inadequate water storage and irrigation infrastructure to utilize precipitation when it does fall. He noted that many smallholder farmers outside the Dry Corridor face comparable climate vulnerability. Regarding crop production, Castellanos explained that yields are already declining for both staple food and cash crops because of climate stresses that exceed local adaptive capacities. Subsistence farmers predominantly cultivate corn and beans for direct consumption, which are highly vulnerable to rainfall disruptions. They also grow coffee as a cash crop, which is climate sensitive and requires specific temperature conditions only present at certain elevations. As temperatures warm, coffee production will need to shift upslope and will eventually run out of viable area. This threatens both the livelihoods of farmers as well as national economies reliant on coffee exports—not to mention coffee consumers worldwide.

Structural challenges to resilience – Another workshop participant observed that, within academic circles, it is widely understood that systemic socioeconomic deficiencies are driving climate-related risk. However, this understanding has often failed to penetrate the thinking around climate resilience building, which frequently treats climate-specific actions as being distinct from broader development needs. In the participant’s view, this forced separation yields unproductive, decontextualized approaches fixated on technical exposures rather than on holistic solutions tackling root vulnerabilities. The participant asked how panelists might approach this persistent challenge. In response, Castellanos fully agreed that poverty, inequality, and lack of opportunity constitute the core chronic vulnerabilities in the region, versus discrete exposure to climate hazards. In his view, while profound development issues have plagued the region for centuries, the emergence of climate change as an issue has provided urgency and political capital to finally address these structural gaps enabling climate risks. He conceded that progress remains stymied by lack of public-sector capacity, even where straightforward solutions exist. As an example, he observed that basic improvements in irrigation techniques could massively boost subsistence farmer resilience, but that governments have dragged their feet in implementation. This has partly been an issue of limited tax revenues, which constrain public investments in adaptation, but also one of endemic corruption. Castellanos explained that, even when adaptation funding is allocated, it frequently fails to reach intended beneficiaries because of graft, collusion, and mismanagement. In his view, until corruption and lack of accountability are confronted, climate change will continue to disproportionately harm the marginalized and vulnerable.

Role of governance – Another workshop participant asserted that governance merits a central place in the discussion around climate security and asked the panelists whether it ought to be considered the pivotal factor or just one consideration among many. In response, Castellanos stated that governance is unquestionably critical at both the national and local levels, with local administrations playing vital roles in spearheading grassroots adaptation actions. He also noted that, in the absence of government initiatives, community self-organization also plays a major role in climate resilience. Castellanos reiterated that financial constraints hinder government climate action, given miniscule tax collection, competing priorities vying for scant resources, and a persistent view that adaptation initiatives are longer-term concerns. The IC panelist also opined that climate change adaptation and resilience seldom seem to fit into the immediate interests of leaders focused on maintaining power and stability. Both Castellanos and the IC officer noted, however, that major agricultural enterprises are taking climate change seriously because of its clear business impacts, and that their private policies and investments significantly outpace public efforts—and, in many instances, provide de facto governance. David Holiday contributed a perspective on El Salvador, where the democratically elected populist leader Nayib Bukele enjoys widespread popularity and sweeping executive authority. Holiday suggested that this concentration of power could enable strong climate governance and major policy shifts if Bukele were persuaded that

escalating climate vulnerability threatens the country’s future stability and thus his own political fortunes. While not diminishing El Salvador’s pervasive corruption, Holiday saw a potential opening to spur action through enlightened self-interest at the top. He conceded, however, the country’s unattractive investment climate remains an obstacle.

Development and maladaption – In a closing comment, Eric Olson argued that the traditional foreign policy view of Central America—in which one reflexively views external investment and private-sector engagement as beneficial—could be reoriented to account for climate change. He cited the specific example of the U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris’s recent announcement of a Call to Action for Northern Central America that challenged U.S. corporations to invest in economic development in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. While the call resulted in more than $4.2 billion in private-sector commitments, Olson questioned how investments in sectors such as coastal tourism might exacerbate climate and security vulnerabilities in addition to producing economic growth. In his view, there is no easy decoupling of “good” development from maladaptation under climate stress. This encourages rethinking long-held assumptions around how the international community conceptualizes progress in Central America, to build more nuanced approaches aligning development with climate adaptation and risk-reduction needs.