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Findings

During its discussions and information-gathering activities, the committee identified several risks Confucius Institutes (CIs) pose and developed three categories of findings related to these risks. The first category relates to relevant background and context associated with CIs. The second and third categories focus on the effect of CIs on academic freedom and university governance and on Department of Defense (DOD)–funded research, respectively. The latter two categories allow the committee to expand on overarching concerns regarding CIs: that the presence of a CI on campus may undermine U.S. values of academic freedom, freedom of expression, and academic governance and may jeopardize research security by creating a platform embedded in a U.S. university that the Chinese government could use for nontraditional intelligence gathering and espionage.

FINDINGS REGARDING BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

1. CIs are one aspect of the Chinese Communist Party’s government-coordinated, long-term plan to influence international perspectives about China. Addressing CIs in isolation will not solve the research security challenge on U.S. campuses, and DOD should think strategically about the overall challenge.
2. There is clear evidence of the Chinese government’s intent for CIs to promote positive views of China abroad and influence the presentation of issues pertaining to China at institutions of higher education. The CI structure facilitates the Chinese government’s direct oversight and influence within CI operations.

3. The U.S. visa-granting system vets all foreign nationals on campus, including CI personnel, graduate students, postdoctoral fellows, and visiting scholars. With this being said, the Chinese government vets all CI staff provided by the Chinese partner institution, and these individuals may pose more of a concern than other Chinese nationals on campus.
4. Many institutions hosting CIs felt that there was real benefit to having the organizations on campus (Fowler, 2018; Kaleem et al., 2022), and that they could maintain the relationship appropriately through increased control, transparency, and clarity in the contractual relationship and management of the CI (Kaleem et al., 2022). This would protect core American university values of openness, transparency, and academic freedom.
5. Federal dollars for language education and area studies have decreased over the past several years, leaving a funding gap and creating an opening for other sources of nonfederal funding, including CIs, to support such activities (Flaherty, 2018; Franks, 2019; Friedman, 2015; NHA, 2022).
6. The loss of CIs on U.S. campuses has had a disproportionate effect on less affluent universities and their communities through the loss of resources and instruction for language and cultural studies at the K–12 and university levels (Allen-Ebrahimian, 2018).
7. Having students who are interested in China and who have received exposure to and training in Chinese language and culture is an economic and national security advantage for the United States in an increasingly complex geopolitical environment (Asia Society, 2005).
8. Industry needs Chinese language and cultural training and programming, as it depends on employees who understand Chinese culture and speak Mandarin to support trade and other international engagements (ACTFL, 2019).
9. DOD eroded trust with universities when it requested that universities submit waiver applications, rejected them all, and then provided no subsequent information about the criteria or reason for refusal (Kaleem et al., 2022). DOD did not issue any waivers in 2018 and 2019 based on its determination that issuing waivers was not in the national interest.

FINDINGS REGARDING THE EFFECT OF CIS ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE

10. CIs create potential risks to academic freedom and freedom of expression on U.S. campuses that disproportionally affect Chinese faculty, staff, and students.

11. In the past, some CIs have not been subject to the usual academic policies that ensure robust faculty governance and oversight at U.S. institutions of higher education.
12. Some agreements governing the creation and operation of CIs contemplated the application of Chinese law under certain circumstances. This may create conflicts for Chinese faculty, staff, and students.
13. The extent of the risk presented to academic freedom is clear; however, more research is needed to analyze and better understand whether this risk is more significant at smaller institutions with less diversity in sources of learning on Chinese language and culture.

FINDINGS REGARDING THE EFFECT OF CIS ON DOD-FUNDED RESEARCH

14. The committee is not aware of any publicly known instance of attempted espionage associated with a CI, and is not aware of any publicly known evidence that the presence of a CI on campus increases risks to DOD-funded research. However, the committee recognizes that a determined adversary might try to exploit CI connections to access privileged research (Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2019b).
15. CIs, as a foreign government-sponsored entity on campus, pose a risk that host institutions can manage—but not fully eliminate—with policies, procedures, and controls.
16. Good digital and physical security for research is paramount and necessary to protect DOD-funded research, regardless of whether a CI is present on campus (Mroz, 2021).
17. The current processes to protect classified research at institutions of higher education, including compliance with the National Industrial Security Program and the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual, are sufficient to protect against risks associated with CIs.

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